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Western Constitutionalism and African
Nationbuilding: The Anglophonic
East African Experience
By FLETCHER N. BALDWIN, JR.*
During the past thirty years there has been a rapid acceleration
in the birth rate of nations of peoples as the Third World have de-
manded that colonial powers remove themselves.' The desire of the
new nations to acquire instant partnership in technological society has
been intense. Nations composed of fragmented tribes and cultures, not
yet indicated on maps or included in textbooks, with names and regula-
tions still strange to their own lands, have emerged as voting partici-
pants in the world decisions of the United Nations. The birthing proc-
ess has frequently been laborious; even where it has occurred with
ease, there have been severe postpartum difficulties.2
In conjunction with the creation of the newly independent coun-
tries, written constitutions were prepared. In anglophonic Africa the
constitutions were modeled after the Westminster principles of parlia-
mentary government. Many of the constitutions are also similar to that
of the United States and to the ideals expressed in the unwritten "con-
stitution!' of Great Britain.' But while the initial written constitutions
reflected western ideals, ithe manner of their implementation reflects
the legacy of -the complex and diverse traditions of Africa. The Afri-
can experience may indicate the noncolonial value patterns of the fu-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida, College of Law.
1. See generally L. KEsrEOOT, INTELLECT AL OsmoNs OF THE ASmCAN Rnvo-
LUTION (1972); A. OBomE, TE COMMON MAN'S CHARTER (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Oom].
2. See J. MAQuET, AIlIcANrrY 116-26 (1972).
3. See Morris & Read, Uganda, in 13 THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF rrs LAws AND CONSrTIONs 87-124 (G. Keeton ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Morris & Read]; Baldwin, A Constitutional Comparison: Mexico, the United
States and Uganda, 10 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 82 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Baldwin, A
Constitutional Comparison]; Ghai, Constitutions and the Political Order in East Africa,
21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 403, 411-12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ghai].
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ture. For, generally, the African constitutions have only worked where
they have been flexible enough to serve the process of nationbuilding
under a strong ruling power.
Unfortunately, what is good for the party in power has not always
been good for the nation. The East African countries have in practice
all but abolished the Westminster parliamentary form of government;
in its place an all-powerful presidency has emerged. It is only prag-
matic constitutions serving the ever changing needs of an African ruler
that have had any hope of survival.
This paper will examine the relevance of the Westminster prin-
ciples as articulated in the anglophonic African independence constitu-
tions to the functioning of the newly emerged countries. The Constitu-
tion of Uganda will be the primary focus;4 the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States will serve as a baseline. The paper will discuss the problems
of gaining and retaining the national unity required for a stable nation
and the role of the constitution in this drama. It is possible that past
development and present struggles under the U.S. Constitution can pro-
vide insights that may facilitate the development of stability in new
countries. However, the complex problems facing Third World nations
may necessitate remedies unfamiliar to western constitutional forms of
government. Constitutionalism has been considered by many scholars
to be a tool to insure political stability, natural togetherness and per-
sonal liberties. To date, this tool has not been adequate for these new
nations.
The Colonial Background
Although contact with external forces had long preceded the es-
tablishment of full colonial rule, prior to the twentieth century the Afri-
can continent, especially the area south of the Sahara and north of the
Limpopo River, had little exposure to the industrial revolution and its
implications. The twentieth century may be divided into three com-
ponents for purposes of examining the African experience of develop-
mental change.
4. The author has chosen to focus on Uganda for the following reasons: 1.
Uganda is one of the first nations to achieve a national flavor in its constitution.
2. During the initial reign of President Milton Obote, Uganda appeared to demonstrate
great promise of achieving the Westminster dream of constitutional government; then
it completely negated that achievement with the sweeping elimination of a constita-
tional form of government by the succeeding president, Idi Amin, former chief of de-
fense. Uganda thus became the first East African nation to abandon constitutional rule.
3. The author lived in Uganda and worked with the Uganda Constitution prior to Gen-
eral Amin's assumption of power.
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The first third of the century saw the introduction of a mercantile,
commercial economy and a stratified, pluralistic society. 5 However, the
rural population remained on the extreme periphery of these changes.
The second third of the century witnessed the buildup, and later the
dismantling, of the colonial political empire. Continued expansion of
the frontiers of commercial economic activity facilitated the movement
of population into the periphery of modem sociocultural influences."
The last third of the century, beginning with the late 1960's, witnessed
accession to independence.
In order to achieve a more balanced and integrated economic, po-
litical and social structure, the transformation of African society had to
be carefully planned so that all segments of the population would come
to accept the new order. The challenge posed by independence was
whether, given the political experience achieved and the pressures gen-
erated during the previous periods, planned efforts could be successful
in facilitating self-sustaining growth. A further challenge was-and
is-whether planned development can occur in a context of social
equality and political stability as articulated in the constitutions of the
various African nations.
In Africa, as in other parts of the Third World, development, plan-
ned or unplanned, is occurring rapidly. A conglomeration of predom-
inantly subsistence-based rural societies is being invaded and replaced
by non-agrarian, urbanized, national communities.8 Commercial de-
velopments in agriculture, -and the growth of large urban areas offer-
ing a wide range of modem services, have caused migration from rural
areas to the towns and cities. In the years immediately following inde-
pendence, a population settled and employed in cities and towns was
thought a necessary concomitant of economic development and cultural
change. Urban areas are the sites for many of the most productive
5. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (N. Uphoff & W.
Ilchman eds. 1972); Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, Eng-
lish-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 999.
6. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
ECONOMIC DEvELOPMENT OF UGANDA 5-36 (1962). See generally Okigbo, Independ-
ence and the Problem of Economic Growth, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN AFRICA 323
(M. Herskovits & M. Horwitz eds. 1964).
7. See Miller, The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania, in
THE POLITCAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT 425 (N. Uphoff & W. Ilcnhman eds. 1972);
Morse, The Economics of African Socialism, in AFRICAN SOCIALISM 35 (C.W.H. Friedland
& C.G. Rosberg ed. 1964); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (Gov't Printer, Nai-
robi, 1971); ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, 24 AFRICA 41 (1973).
8. See generally A. MABOGUNJE, URBANIZATION IN NIGERIA (1968); P. VAN DEN
BERGHE, AFRICA, SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF CHANGE AND CONFLICT (1965).
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kinds of economic activity and are an essential locus for specialized en-
terprise and services. They are also -the areas in which political
change, unrest, and ferment occur.
In an urban environment there are increased opportunities for in-
dividual initiative and choice. Urban family patterns, child-rearing
practices, and social groupings attune to life in a heterogenous and flex-
ible community, -and urban life reflects less strongly than its rural coun-
terpart the culture base from which the inhabitants come.9 Urban cen-
ters are seen as the hinges of development, confronting local peoples
and customs with the wider world, generating simultaneously new ex-
pectations and the means of their satisfaction through economic, politi-
cal and social change.
Many African nations, however, have only one major city of any
size or importance, 10 while the remainder of these nations continues to
be rural. Efforts by the newly independent governments to achieve
a modern technological society through reliance upon foreign aid (and
the implied corollary of urbanization) served to destroy rather than pro-
mote a sense of nationhood. Consequently, many African countries to-
day have abandoned the policy of rapid urbanization which they pur-
sued upon achieving nationhood, and give priority in current and pro-
posed planning to rural development. However, the rural areas are
where the problems of communications and factionalism are greatest. 1
At independence in anglophonic countries, constitutions patterned
after western principles were adopted and announced as the source to
which these countries could look for political stability and for protec-
tion of individual liberties."2 Yet the independence constitutions of
most anglophonic countries were designed to cope with an already ur-
banized community.13 The constitutions failed to recognize the needs
of a rural population;'14 yet the rural population retained most of the
customs and heritage uniting the particular region. The new constitu-
tions indicated a belief that reliance upon traditions was incompatible
9. See W. HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN G-ANA (1966).
10. P. ALLEN & A. SErAL, THE TRAvELER's AFRICA: A GuiDE To THE ENr=n
CoNTINENT (1973).
11. See Verbit, TANU Builds the Nation, 81 YALE LJ. 334, 338-39 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Verbit]; see generally J. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND SOC I.IsM/UmuRu NA
UjAmAA (1968) [hereinafter cited as UJAMAA]; J. NYERERB, FREEDOM AND UNITY/
UHURU NA UMOJA (1967) [hereinafter cited as UmoJA].
12. See Baldwin, A Constitutional Comparison, supra note 3.
13. See Verbit, supra note 11, at 338-39.
14. See id. at 11; R. JAMES & F. KASSAM, LAW AND ITS ADmItSTIO IN A ONE
PARTY STATE (1973).
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with economic, social and political modernization.' 5 Nevertheless, the
history and traditions of the people could not be easily altered with the
designing of a flag and the pronouncement of nationhood.'"
Prior to the colonial period the African people possessed inde-
pendent religious and legal systems. The reigning colonial powers la-
ter imposed boundaries for new territories with little or no consideration
of -territorial imperatives. The "boundaries" arbitrarily divided legal
systems and tribal communities. In West Africa, for example, national
boundary lines were drawn vertically into the interior according to a
coastal -territory division among the European seagoing powers. Lan-
guage barriers and the resultant communication difficulties were inev-
itably troublesome obstacles to effective government in many of those
African nations. 17  In East Africa, tribal villages and tribal languages
were split. Six major language groups now exist in the region, each
as different from -the others as English is from Chinese. Each major
group is further subdivided into other languages and dialects. Once
it became clear that differences in custom, language and notions of po-
litical processes would render parliamentary government unworkable,
the realities of the various national problems caused strong individual
leaders to emerge as a replacement for constitutional rule.' 8 The var-
15. See generally UJAMAA, supra note 11; OBOTE, supra note 1; Seidman, Constitu-
tions in Independent, Anglophonic, Sub-Saharan Africa: Form and Legitimacy, 1969
Wis. L. RFv. 83.
16. In the cosmopolitan urban centers of Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Nairobi and
the like, there is not adequate shelter; there are inadequate employment opportunities;
public services are insufficient to meet the constantly growing demands, and the govern-
ments, for the most part, do not have the revenue to meet the needs of the people.
These inadequacies foment great displeasure. The people find as their root enemy the
laws and the constitution of the nation. The result is that the leaders do not have time
to allow the new residents the opportunity to democratically arrive at a consensus of
will. Consequently, the governments in the various nations achieve nationhood through
their own concept of what is good for the particular nation. See Economic Progress
and Problems, 24 AmucA 41 (1973); W. HARVEY, LAw Am SocAL CHANGE IN GHANA
(1966). See generally UJAmAA, supra note 11; UMOJA, supra note 11; Ghai, supra note
3, at 417-21.
17. The impact of colonialism may be seen in Senegal and Gambia, two major in-
dependent nations which are relatively homogeneous with respect to language and reli-
gion, and which were divided by European powers. Senegal was taken by the French,
Gambia by the British. Each thus inherited a different language, a different system of
laws, a different concept of presidents, a different notion of history, a different admin-
istrative and judicial system, and a different analysis of judicial review.
18. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania has attempted to avoid this result by
transferring his charismatic qualities to the governmental structure which he heads, so
that the institutions of his government will survive him. See Verbit, supra note 11, at
353-57. From readings and observations it would appear to the author that Tanzania
is well on its way to achieving the Nyerere goals of nationhood. Unfortunately the
goals seem too closely tied to the man and his personal appeal to the people.
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ious political systems began placing their hopes for stability in the hands
of charismatic leaders. 19
A Contrast: The Articulation of National Goals in
Post-Colonial America
In the United States and Great Britain it has often been observed
that the nations and laws regulating them are a product of consensus
and commitment. The political literature of modem western nations
in their early years of formation articulates the unifying principles
around which the nation and its people would be organized.20
In the United States, -the unifying goals were articulated in the De-
claration of Independence, the Federalist Papers, and the Constitution.
In addition -to establishing a basis for rebellion, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence stated the goals around which the colonies united; that is, "to
institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as -to them shall seem most likely
to effect their safety and happiness."'21  Once these goals were set forth
in the declaration, however, the question arose of how the government
was to be structured so that they could be attained.
Under the Articles of Confederation the thirteen American states
19. In 1960, President Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union party
(TANU) won virtually unanimous control of the National Assembly in the first inde-
pendence government elected in Tanzania. See Verbit, supra note 11, at 337. TANU's
national movement under Nyerere has continued to strengthen its hold on the political
life of the nation. See id. at 343-52; H. BIENEN, TANZANIA: PARTY TRANSFORMATION
AND EcoNoznc DEVELOPMENT (exp. ed. 1970).
This pattern works well where the leader has the support of tho strong party in the
nation, but it results in confusion and even chaos where leaders clash, as in Uganda
where Prime Minister Obote came into conflict with the Kabaka of Buganda and later
with his commander-in-chief, Idi Amin. The unifying features in Tanzania developed
from the powerful TANU national movement, whose ideals were expounded in the
"Arusha Declaration" (reprinted in full in UJAMAA, supra note 11, at 231-50). In
Uganda once the clash between the Prime Minister and Kabaka was settled by an over-
throw of the Kabaka, the nation moved in the direction of Tanzan;Ys development with
one party in power and a strong party platform set forth in the COM,1MoN MAN'S CHAR-
TER. The ideas for nationhood developed in both documents haxc competed for a de-
gree of acceptance on the part of the general population. In Tanzania the struggle con-
tinues around the dynamic figure of Julius Nyerere; in Uganda th, struggle ended vio-
lently. In either case the search for national unity takes place within the context of
the supremacy of a political party (TANU) or the supremacy of an individual strong-
man (General Amin), but not as envisioned in the independence constitutions by a con-
sensus of the population.
20. See, e.g., T. TASwELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIoNAL HISTORY (11th
ed., T. Plucknett ed. 1960).
21. C. BECKER, THE DECLARAnON OF INmEPEN ENcE 8 (1958).
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failed to effectively unify for their mutual needs, benefits and obliga-
tions. While the colonial states had been relatively united in the face
of a foreign and oppressive power, no specific need -for continued unity
was immediately apparent when ,the new government was formulated.
Therefore mutual cooperation between states 'began to evaporate.
The evils of such disunity were articulated in the Federalist Pa-
pers. Arguing in favor of the then newly proposed federal constitution,
the Federalist Papers pointed to the inability of the government under
the articles to raise revenue from the states, to pay for the administra-
tion of government and to extinguish the national debt;22 'to the inability
to apply sanctions to insure adherence to its laws;23 to the inability to
regulate commerce;2 to the inability to provide for the national de-
fense;25 and to the absence of federal judicial power.2 6 These defects
were all believed to result from the fact that the existing federal gov-
ernment had authority only over the states in their corporate capacities
as opposed to direct authority over individual citizens.
After recognizing that the American people were already united
by the strongest ties (language, custom, and history),27 John Jay,
in a series of four essays,28 said that previous experience with a national
Congress showed that the majority of the American people accepted
the concept that such a body could knowledgeably determine the best
interests of the entire nation:
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That being convened from different parts of the
country, they brought with them and communicated to each other
a variety of useful information. That in the course of the time they
passed together in enquiring into and discussing the true interests
of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge
on that head. That they were individually interested in the public
liberty and prosperity, and therefore it was not less their inclina-
tion, than their duty, to recommend only such measures, as after
the most mature deliberation they really thought prudent and ad-
visable.29
Such a national consensus would be the best security against hos-
tilities from abroad.30  Moreover, if the people of America should be
22. THE FEDERALIsT No. 7 (A. Hamilton).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (A. Hamilton).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
25. Tim FEDERXLiST No. 23 (A. Hamilton).
26. Tim FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (J. Jay).
28. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 2-5 (J. Jay).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 11-12 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (1. Jay).
30. Tim FEDERALIST No. 3 (1. Jay).
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divided into a number of nations rather than united under a single fed-
eral government,
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,
and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general
interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy
and pursuits. Hence like most other bordering nations, they would
always be either envolved in disputes and war, or live in constant
apprehension of them. 31
Madison in the tenth essay began a masterful explanation of how
a well-constructed republic tends "to break and control the violence of
faction." 32  He described a faction as "a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate inter-
ests of the community.""3  Madison then stated that "[t]here are two
methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its
causes; the other, by controlling its effects. ' 4
Madison favored the latter method because he believed that there
were but two equally unsatisfactory methods of removing the causes of
faction, by destroying the liberty that is essential to its existence or by
giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the
same interests. 5 Quickly dismissing the first remedy as worse than the
disease, Madison showed that the second is as impracticable as the first
is unwiseY6
Having dismissed the possibility of removing the causes of faction,
Madison explained how a well-constructed republic could control the
adverse effects of factions. Assuming that a faction consisted of less
than a majority, he demonstrated that .the republican principle which
enables the majority to defeat the factional interests would be an effec-
tive control.3 7 Madison recognized, however, the need of a democratic
government to control factions when they encompass a majority which
would sacrifice "both the public good and the rights of other citizens"
to its ruling passion or interests.33
To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger
of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and
31. THE FEDmuLiST No. 5, at 24-25 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Jay).
32. THE FkDERALiST No. 10, at 56 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 60.
38. Id. at 60-61.
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form of popular government, is then the great object to which
our inquiries are directed. .... 9
In searching for a means to attain this goal, Madison excluded the
possibilities that either moral or religious motives could be relied on
for adequate control. "They are not found to be such on the injustice
and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the
number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy be-
comes needful."40  Neither, he concluded, could pure democracy be
a cure since it must decide matters solely on the basis of what is felt
by the majority of the whole and since nothing is provided to "check
the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individ-
ual."4 1 Therefore, it was in the design of the proposed republican form
of government that he found a solution.4"
Later essays in the Federalist Papers explain further -how the sep-
aration of the national government into three functionally distinct
branches could help control factions within the federal government.
No law infected with factional interest would endanger the republic un-
less a faction gained total control of all three elements of government.
Such a situation would be most unlikely where the members of each
branch were elected or selected by different means and therefore de-
veloped different independent institutional viewpoints. Such separa-
tion in the federal government was therefore intended not to divide the
nation, but to unify it. 3
Nationhood in Anglophonic East Africa
In anglophonic East Africa the birth of new nations came about
in varying ways. Yet in each country the native political force pre-
paring to take over the reins of government had to have the power
of a political entity behind it. The initial pragmatic purpose of party
formation was therefore to challenge the foreigners who ruled those
countries.4 4
Furthermore, as Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere indicates, the
western ideal of democratic political parties could be counterproduc-
tive in an African setting.45 He argues that political parties and politi-
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 62-64.
43. See Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check of Institu-
tional Misdirection?, 45 IND. LJ. 550 (1970).
44. 1. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 15 (1961).
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cal doctrine have to be tied to the particular nation and to the particu-
lar stage of economic and social growth of the people," and he points
out that African nations do not have "the long tradition of nationhood
nor the strong physical means of national security which older countries
take for granted."4 A handful of people, he notes, -can still put [a]
nation into jeopardy and reduce to ashes the efforts of millions."4 8
Therefore, he concludes, the concept of a constitution mandating a wes-
tern form of democratic rule for such a struggling nation is foreign to
the practical day-to-day notions of nation building.49
President Nyerere argues further that a bill of rights like the one
found in the United States Constitution limits advancement, for there
is very little he can do to effectuate realistic goals and priorities for his
nation under the limitations of a bill of rights. Constitutions, he argues,
cannot guarantee individual rights in a developing-nation setting, espe-
cially when factionalism is inherent in the composition of the popula-
tion. To guarantee individual rights would tend to defeat the very pur-
pose for the guarantees by serving to protect those whose object it is
to destroy democracy. Furthermore, Nyerere points out that a bill of
rights results in grave conflict between the various branches of govern-
ment, especially the judicial and executive branches.50 A conflict such
as this in an emerging nation is ill-afforded since it may bring down
an otherwise stable government; it is a luxury afforded only to de-
veloped nations.51
The concepts of nation-building articulated by Nyerere and de-
veloped in his party's Arusha Declaration are replicated in Uganda.
Under the leadership of President A. Milton Obote, Uganda after inde-
pendence initially moved in the direction of Nyerere's proposal for de-
veloping a Third World.
45. Id. at 8-15.
46. Id. at 14-16; UJAmAA, supra note 11, at 19-22, 37.
47. Extracts from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment
of a Democratic One Party State, in ONE PARTY DEMOCRACY 461 (L. Cliffe ed. 1967).
48. Id.
49. See generally UJAMAA, supra note 11; UMOJA, supra note 11.
50. See Verbit, supra note 11, at 358. It is possible, Nyerere notes, to draft a bill
of rights in which statements of principle are so hedged with provisions and qualifica-
tions that the government retains in large measure the absolute power it had prior to
the articulation of the bill of rights. This technique has the effect of divorcing the pro-
visions of the law from the ethical principles on which they should be based. A bill
of rights in that form provides little protection for the individual and induces in the citi-
zen a mood of cynicism about the whole process of government. Further, it tends to
limit governmental advancement in creative nation-building and create conflict within
the government as if it were a viable document for the protection of individual rights.
51. See Baldwin, A Constitutional Comparison, supra note 3, at 95.
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The Articulation of National Goals in
Post-Independence Uganda
Uganda's population of approximately ten million people is di-
vided principally into four racial groups-Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic,
and Sudanic. Each of these four racial groups has been in turn so-
cially, culturally, and linguistically divided into distinct tribes, kingdoms,
clans, and family units. 52 As one Ugandan notes:
Uganda is a political creature of nineteenth century British imperi-
alism and colonialism ...
Before colonization, the areas were occupied by a diversity of eth-
nic groups, each with its own language, individual cultural, politi-
cal and social styles and traditions. For at least two centuries
most of these ethnic groups had existed as independent societies
with their own kinds of political organizations. It is likely that 90
percent of the people of each ethnic group had never spent a day
outside their own groups-which means that to a great extent, each
group had always existed economically, socially, politically and
physically independent from all other groups.53
Additionally, the Ugandans are divided by religion and language.
It is estimated that just under 50 percent of the Ugandan population
is Christian, 6 percent Muslim, and the remainder followers of tradi-
tional religions or subscribing to no organized system of religious be-
liefs. The Christian community is in turn composed of approximately
55 percent Roman Catholics and 45 percent Protestants. 4
As -a result of British colonial rule, English is probably the best-
understood language. Luganda, the language of Baganda people, is
the vernacular language most often heard, but even its use is restricted
to certain areas. Swahili is -a second language in some parts of the
country, but is not used widely.
The racial, ethnic, political and religious divisions have been a
constant source of friction, at times leading to armed hostilities among
the people of Uganda. Despite continuous efforts to the contrary,
neither a half century of British colonial rule nor a decade of political
independence has united the Ugandans. Clearly, the political experi-
ence under the military dictatorship of General Idi Amin, whereby
Muslim-Sudanic factions are favored at the expense of others, is but
52. For example, the largest racial group, the Bantu, is composed of four ethnic
groups-the Baganda, numbering over three million, the Iteso, the Ankole, and the Ba-
soga, each numbering approximately one million.
53. P. GuKnNA, UGANDA, A CAsB STUDY IN AFIUCAN POLrTCAL DEvELOPMENT 14
(1972) [hereinafter cited as GuKmNA].
54. J. Mwrn, AFICAN RELIGIONS AND PHmosory 299-317 (1969).
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the most recent example of the critical divisions among the people of
Uganda. Thus at first glance, it would seem somewhat presumptuous
to point with certainty to any Ugandan document as the articulation of
national goals.
Given the nature of most political entities, however, it is unlikely
that Uganda will disintegrate into its constituent parts. Moreover, the
longer Uganda remains united by political or military force, the greater
the likelihood that internal unity will develop from the natural com-
mingling of its people. This process can, however, be retarded or ac-
celerated depending upon the manner in which the national govern-
ment is organized and the goals it seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is
of some importance to see how the Ugandan leadership has cultivated
or retarded this synthesis.
The three documents under which the nation of Uganda has
attempted to unify are the Independence Constitution of 1962, Presi-
dent Obote's Constitution of 1967, and the Common Man's Charter,
a socialist manifesto of the Uganda People's Congress. The Independ-
ence Constitution, like the American Articles of Confederation, was an
unsuccessful attempt to establish a unified nation based upon the
existing quasi-independent political units within the national borders.
The Kingdom of Buganda and, to a lesser extent, the Kingdoms of
Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro and the Territory of Busoga, were given
extensive authority over significant matters of local concern.55 More
importantly, the Kabaka (King) retained his position as the hereditary
leader and focal point for unity and loyalty of the highly-centralized
Buganda Kingdom. Representing roughly one third of the Ugandan
population and occupying one fourth of the country, Buganda's unifica-
tion under the Kabaka's leadership posed a threat to the national gov-
ernment. This threat was accentuated when the Kabaka of Buganda,
Sir Edward Mutesa, was installed as the first president of Uganda.56
For one year after independence, the Queen of England, was also
the Queen of Uganda, and the executive authority was formally vested
in her. Thus Queen Elizabeth remained head of state as constitutional
monarch, but acted only on the advice of the Ugandan government. By
amendment to the 1962 Constitution the office of the president was
established to take over this function. Except for his ability to preside
over meetings of the Parliament, the president's power was closely
55. See Morris & Read, supra note 3, at 87-155.
56. See id. at 81-83.
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analogous to that of the Queen. The real power began to be assumed
by the prime minister.57
The natural conflict that arose between the Kabaka of Buganda
(president of the country) and the prime minister of the national gov-
ernment was inflamed in 1966. In a quick succession of events, Prime
Minister A. Milton Obote assumed all governmental powers, declared
that the 1962 Constitution and the Parliament were suspended, and put
down a military uprising by the Kabaka and the Kingdom of Buganda.
In the aftermath, Obote established a unitary form of government based
on the use of military and police force.5"
The Constitution of 1967 was to be an articulation of this new
political order. The government was to be functionally divided
between three branches of government, 9 limited by constitutionally
protected rights and freedoms of the individual.60 But while ostensibly
the 1967 Constitution was to be the supreme law of Uganda, the con-
centration of power in the office of the presidency jeopardized the con-
tinued effectiveness of the Constitution and the other components of
government.
The most significant concentration of power in the president was
the result of article 21 of the Ugandan Constitution, which empowers
the president, acting in accordance with the advice of the cabinet, to
declare that a state of emergency exists in Uganda or any part thereof.
This power in practice includes the power of the president to suspend
all or any part of the Constitution during these periods of emergency.61
This power is not limited or controlled in any meaningful way by
the Constitution or by the other elements of government. Although
the president supposedly acts in accordance with the advice of the cabi-
57. The 1962 Independence Constitution of Uganda which implemented West-
minster principles including a Chief of State, Prime Minister, and Parliament was
adopted at the London Constitutional Conference of 1961. That conference also set the
schedule for independence. Uganda became independent October 9, 1962; see Morris
& Read, supra note 3, at 74-81. At present Uganda is under military rule, General Idi
Amin having come to power by force of arms in 1971.
58. See generally GuKIINA, supra note 53. See also Uganda v. Commissioner of
Prisons, Ex Parte Matovu, [1966] E. Afr. L.R. 514, 521-24 (Uganda). This case resulted
in the new Constitution being drafted by President Obote and approved as the law of
the land on September 8, 1967.
59. TH CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA chs. IV (The Executive), V (Par-
liament), and VIII (The Judicature) (1967).
60. Id. at ch. I (Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individ-
ual). The Kingdom of Buganda and the Kabaka were effectively eliminated by ch. M,
art. 8, cl. 3 and ch. VII, art. 81.
61. Id. at ch. HI, art. 21.
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net, article 33 makes it clear that their tenure in office is subject totally
to the president's discretion. Moreover, article 79 states that when the
president is required by any provision of the Constitution to act in
accordance with the advice of any person or authority, 62 the question
of whether he has done so cannot be inquired into by any court.6 3
Although article 21 limits the time period within which a state
of emergency may exist without approval of the National Assembly, 64
President Obote successfully contended that he could suspend that part
of the Constitution so as to extend the state of emergency for as long
as he deemed necessary. In addition, the article provides the president
with the ability to use preventive detention during a state of emer-
gency.65 While this power may constitutionally be exercised only by
providing 'the individual with specific grounds for his detention, as well
as providing judicial review of those grounds and the opportunity to
consult legal counsel, -these safeguards have not been given effect in
practice. This unlimited power of detention aided President Obote in
silencing political opposition.
Another source of presidential power is found in articles 61 and
62, which provide that the president controls the time and place of each
annual session of Parliament and may prorogue or dissolve Parliament.
Since the Parliament continues for five years from the date of its first
sitting unless dissolved,66 the president could constitutionally prorogue
the Parliament at the first sitting of each yearly session for the entire
five year period. President Obote used another theory, however, in
ridding himself of a bothersome Parliament. By both declaring a state
of emergency and dissolving Parliament, he contended that he could
constitutionally suspend that portion of article 6167 which requires a
new general election within sixty days of the date of dissolution.
Other sources of power are in article 58, which gives the president
an absolute veto over bills passed by Parliament, and article 64, which
gives him the power to legislate in any exceptional circumstance when
immediate action is necessary. Power also stems from the natural
62. Id.
63. Id. at ch. VI, art. 79, el. 1.
64. Id. at ch. m, art. 21, cl. 2. The National Assembly is the legislative arm of
the government and together with the president makes up the Parliament. Id. at ch. V,
arts. 39, 40.
65. Id. at ch. i, art. 21, cls. 5, 6. See also Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons,
Ex Parte Matovu, [1966] E. Afr. L.R. 514, 521-24 (Uganda).
66. THE CoNsT. oF THE REPUBmic oF UrANDA ch. V, art. 62, cl. 3 (1967).
67. Id. at ch. V, art. 61, cl. 3.
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dominance of the president as the political leader of the ruling party
in the National Assembly.
The judicial branch established by the 1967 Constitution was
expected to uphold the Constitution and to protect individual rights.
Chapter M of the Constitution, however, limits the protection of human
rights where such rights conflict with the public interest.6 8
Finally, the demise of a federated system of government increased
the power of the national government; thus the power of the national
leader was magnified. Nowhere is this more apparent than in article
80, which divides Uganda into eighteen districts whose internal govern-
ments are established by Parliament. Nowhere in this list is the King-
dom of Buganda-in its place are four separate and distinct districts
of no greater prominence than any other district in Uganda. 9
The accumulation of all governmental power, first in the hands
of President Obote, and presently in the hands of General Amin, has
a significance beyond simply the failure of Uganda to establish a demo-
cratic and constitutional form of government. Given the existence of
a nation, arbitrarily established by a colonial conference without taking
into account the lack of internal unity or common purpose necessary
for self-adhesion,7 0 the development of a dictatorship was a predictable
result of tribal disunity and national apathy.
To militate against a one-leader national policy, the Uganda
People's Congress under President Obote's leadership adopted the
Common Man's Charter as -the party's platform for the development of
"full security, justice, equality, liberty and welfare for all sons and
daughters of the Republic of Uganda .... ",71 Significantly, it
advocated that the economic as well as political power of the nation
be vested in the majority of the people.72 It recognized that in the
past the nation's human and material resources had been exploited for
the benefit of a small privileged class, 73 but that Uganda could not af-
ford to build two nations within its territorial boundaries, "one rich,
educated, African in appearance but mentally foreign, and the other,
which constitutes the majority of the population, poor and illiterate." 74
68. Id. at ch. III, art. 8, & 5.
69. Id. at ch. V11, art. 80, CL 1.
70. Even the nation's boundaries were an arbitrary decision by external powers.
See A. McEwEN, ITmwnATioNAL BouNAuus oF EAST AmucA (1971).
71. OioTE, supra note 1, at 2.
72. Id. at 16.
73. See id. at 12-13.
74. Id. at 12.
EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCESpring 19751
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
To develop a more equitable distribution, the Charter emphasized the
diversification of the economy to make it less dependent on foreign
trade, nationalization of private industries, the creation of a cooperative
bank catering solely to the peasants in order to induce the development
of local industries, and massive education of the people of Uganda in
order to allow establishment and operation of industries that would be
controlled by the people collectively.Y5
The Charter's emphasis on the evils of economic oppression and
the means of eliminating it was in sharp contrast to the emphasis in
the Declaration of Independence and the Federalist Papers on the evils
of and remedies for political suppression. Where the Federalist Papers
argued that a unified nation is dependent on the creation of a struc-
turally divided, balanced and limited federal republic, the Charter
sought to establish national unity through a broad distribution of the
nation's wealth. The two different approaches are understandable in
view of the distinct colonial experiences of the two nations. Whereas
the most visible threat -to liberty in colonial America was an unre-
strained foreign military and political governing power, in Uganda the
most visible threat was the exploitation of the nation's wealth for the
benefit of a few. As a direct result, within each nation clear ideas
developed as to how the continuance of the respective injustices could
be avoided. Ultimately, however, -the governmental structure estab-
lished in Uganda could not overcome tribal, religious and linguistic dif-
ferences, and the attempt to create a strong unitary government without
the benefits of a workable division of governmental powers resulted in
a political dictatorship.
Separation of Powers in Independent Africa
The strong executive emerging in many African states is a con-
tradiction of the independence constitutions. A strong leader often was
able to use the independence constitution as an example of continued
colonial control by treating the document more as a treaty with a
conquering nation than as a politically ideal compact. The rejection
of the Westminster parliamentary principles reflected, in part, a desire
to return to concepts of native law which the new leadership argued
had been all but ignored by the colonial rulers. The history of Uganda
presents the best example of the complexity of the problem faced at
independence.
Uganda was colonized in the mid-nineteenth century.7 The
75. Id. at 16-18.
76. See generaly A. MOREHEAD, THE WiITB NwiB 323-60 (1960).
[Vol. 2
EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
British, upon arrival in the territory that would be Uganda, found
separate African kingdoms operating under complex political and legal
institutions. The most powerful kingdom within the territory was that
of Buganda, 77 which was placed under British protectorate in 1894. By
1896 the entire region was included under British control.
The British brought with them a common law78 tradition that by
its very nature did not take into account the several centuries of
developing legal and political traditions in the new territory.7  The
Kingdom of Buganda had functioned under a constitutional arrange-
ment with executive authority placed in the Kabaka or King, who exer-
cised his authority within an accepted political structure.
[U]nder ordinary circumstances he took one or more of the chiefs
into his confidence, and asked their advice, but if this was contrary
to his wishes, he disregarded it, and followed his own desires. The
details of government were carried on by a mixed body of chiefs,
with their King attheir head .... 10
The Kabaka 'had the power to appoint chiefs, declare war and raise
taxes. 81  Although the Kabaka was considered the center of govern-
ment, his decisions were subject to a form of "judicial review." The
traditional priests of Buganda, Mandwa, each represented a national
god which was invested with supernatural powers.8 2  If, for example,
a war was contemplated,
[a] messenger sent from the War-god to the King advocating a
punitive expedition was often the first step in preparation for war.
Chiefs were sent by the King with presents to the gods, to ask their
advice as to the conduct of the war and the choice of a leader. The
gods would name the person who was to be chosen as general
83
77. See generally J. RoscoE, THE BAGANDA (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
RoscoB].
78. UGANDA DEP'T OF STAT PUBLICATION 7958 (Dec. 1967). See Morris & Read,
supra note 3, at 3-14; Macneil, Research in East African Law, 3 E. AFR. L.. 47, 47-
48 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Macneil].
79. See J. Byamugisha, Introduction to the Law of Uganda (unpublished thesis in
Makerere Univ. Library at Kampala, Uganda, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Byamugisha].
See also Cotran, The Position of Customary Criminal Law in African Countries, in
EAST AxlucAN LAW AND SocAL fANGE 14 (G. Sawyer ed. 1967). Compare (as to
experience with other colonial powers) Woodman, Some Realism About Customary
Law-The West African Experience, 1969 WIs. L. Rlv. 128.
80. RoscoE, supra note 77, at 232.
81. Id. at 233-34.
82. Id. at 271-74.
83. Id. at 348. See generally J. SPoxE, JouRN AL oF THE DiscovnY oF THE
SounRc OF THE NraE 262 (reprinted 1908).
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The difficulties of the pluralistic society were compounded by the
introduction of historical English common law. The methodology of
reception varied. It could come through adoption by reference, codi-
fication, or specific acts of the English Parliament being implanted into
the local law. As Professor Robert Seidman notes:
The most common form of reception ... was the general recep-
tion statute . . . . That statute, of which Ghana's (the earliest)
may be taken as an archetype, usually appeared either as local leg-
islation or in the Order-in-Council establishing the colony or pro-
tectorate. The Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876 con-
tained the following clause establishing the basic law: "The com-
mon law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general ap-
plication which were in force in England on the date when the col-
ony obtained a local legislature, that is to say, 24th July, 1874, shall
be in Force within the jurisdiction of this Court." The exceptions
to this broad reception statute, however, were far broader than the
statute itself. The same statute provided that:
"Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court
of the right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall
deprive any person of the benefit, of any law or custom ex-
isting in said Colony and Territories subject to its jurisdiction,
such law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, eq-
uity or good conscience nor incompatible either directly or by
necessary implication with any enactment of the Colonial Leg-
islature . . . ." (Court Ordinance, 1876, § 19 (Gold Coast))."
Since numerically the persons who could claim the benefit of cus-
tomary law-the entire African population-far exceeded the Euro-
pean population, in every English-speaking African state the strange
anomaly obtained, that the "basic" law-English Law-applied to
a miniscule proportion of the population, but the "exceptional"
law-customary law-applied to the vast majority.84
84. Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking,
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis. L. Rnv. 999, 1006-1007 (footnotes omitted). See aslo
Macneil, supra note 78. Seidman points out the sharp contrast bctween the common
law and customary law. For example, separate ownership of property was the emerging
common law concept whereas ownership of property was connected with actual use un-
der customary law. See 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 1005-08. Thus contracts became the
mainstay of property rights under the received English law. See id. at 1009, 1016-18.
However, the received law left out certain aspects of English common law. New con-
cepts of social welfare were imposing restrictions upon the freedom to use property in
England. See id. at 1008. These concepts, which had been codified during the indus-
trial revolution, were not made a part of the law of Uganda. See id. Furthermore, al-
though tribal law was not made a part of the residual law of Uganda, it fhad to be at
least minimally respected by the British Commission when enacting ordinances for
Uganda and the courts were to apply it in suits between Africans when it was not con-
trary to other law or repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, as inter-
preted by the English courts. See id. at 1007, 1025-26; Mayambala v. Buganda Gov't
[1962] E. Afr. L.R. 283 (Uganda). See also Veitch, Civil Defamation in Uganda,
1960-70, 7 E. Aex. ..J. 39 (1971).
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The major difficulty was, and still is, that the tribal law applies
only to individual tribes. The task of harmonizing and meshing
customary law with the superstructure of imported English constitu-
tionalism appeared insurmountable. Dr. Joseph Byamugisha, a
Uganda advocate, argues that by restating and codifying customary law,
making sure that it remains separate and distinct from all other laws,
the difficulty may be surmounted. 5 However, the result is confusion,
as reflected in much of the legislation regulating Uganda. Prior to in-
dependence, for example, the British commissioner for each district in
the country could make ordinances for the administration of justice, the
raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order and good govern-
ment of all persons within his region. For all practical purposes it was
the commissioner, the Englishman appointed by the colonial power,
who made the laws for Uganda. He used several forms.
First, direct application
The commissioner had the power to apply to Uganda statutes that
were in effect in the United Kingdom and India. Commissioners used
this power by declaring that under local ordinances certain enumerated
statutes would be applicable to Uganda though not locally enacted.
Entire statutes were applied with few, if any, modifications. This
method of legal import on the local level should not be confused with
the general importing clause already referred to which imported to
Uganda the English common law, equity, and statutes of general appli-
cation. This general law was -to be applied only -to the extent that local
circumstances permitted, and gave precedence to tribal law in suits
between Africans. However, specially applied statutes under direct
application, that is, by virtue of the commissioner's declaration, were
not subject to such qualifications and they became the law of the
Ugandan protectorate, just as if they 'had been locally enacted. In the
protectorate courts the judges had to look to those statutes to ascertain
the scope of the commissioner's declarations and the content of what
were now local statutes.8 6
Second, codification of common law
Some statutes made by the commissioner and his successors were
codified versions of the English common law. The commissioner
based his legislation on both -text and code. He usually took very little
85. Byamugisha, supra note 79.
86. See Morris & Read, supra note 3, at 237-40; Byamugisha, supra note 79.
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care to incorporate local concepts. Dr. Byamugisha argues that a
general feature of codification of 'the common law is that there is a built
in: pledge to implement common law precedent. Codified law has
given the greatest trouble to the courts of Uganda.8 7
Third, re-enactment of English or Indian statutes
Certain English and Indian statutes were re-enacted and became
written law of the protectorate of Uganda. This method was different
from direct application in that such re-enacted statutes appeared on the
protectorate statute book; however, the purpose and effect was essen-
tially the same as in direct application. Again, very little effort was
made to conform to local conditions and, indeed, interpretations were
found in decisions of the Indian courts, not the Ugandan courts. s
Fourth, straight innovations
To some extent, the British did try to incorporate local law.
Native authorities were legally set up, native courts were established,
and the native authorities were given the duty to make such laws as
were necessary for the native courts. Much of their work came from
native or tribal customary law. In the colonial courts it was applied
to African disputes only. In the native courts it was the law of the
court.8 9 The confusion of incorporating this customary law into a
system of common law is apparent. In the colonial courts customary
law was subject to a national test. In native courts customary law was
not subject to any national test. However, an appeal could be taken
from a native court to the colonial court in which case a national test
was applied. Colonial administrators could not apply customary law to
themselves nor to anyone who was not an African. Even the Africans
were allowed to opt out of a customary law court when and if they real-
ized that their case would be in jeopardy.
Because of the weakness of customary law and because of the
Africans' distrust of the imported British laws, traditional courts grew
up. The traditional courts were distinct from native courts and they
were not normally interfered with by the colonial courts. Traditional
courts became the people's courts. Thus, by 1962, the legal and
judicial system in Uganda was in a most complex state. One point did
87. See Morris & Read, supra note 3, at 241-44.
88. See id. at 237-42.




stand out, however; the courts of Uganda at the time of independence
were courts that were quite willing to involve themselves in conflicts
and the people recognized the willingness of the judges to settle
disputes. 90
The "independence" Uganda received in 1962 was in effect the
transfer of political power from a foreign group of rulers to a local group
of rulers. By the Uganda (Independence) Order-in-Council 1962, the
British in effect gave up active participation in the management of
Uganda. It was impossible, however, to completely remove colonial
power and influence.
When the Independence Constitution came into effect it was the
supreme law of Uganda. But along with the new Independence Con-
stitution came the Judicature Act whose purpose was:
To declare the jurisdiction of the High Court and Subordinate
Courts; to apply to Uganda with exceptions adaptations and modi-
fications certain acts of the parliament of the United Kingdom re-
lating to the jurisdiction of courts in similar matters .... 91
It also adopted the colonial laws and reasserted the operation of the
English common law, English doctrines of equity and the statutes of
general application that were in effect before October 9, 1962.92 The
Judicature Act made no mention of customary law; this in effect denied
jurisdiction in customary law to courts that had seemingly been people's
courts. Independence, however, did achieve a certain breakthrough.
The Independence Constitution of Uganda was utilized by the nation
builders in Uganda to begin enacting into law many tribal law concepts.
The initial constitution of 1962 was one that paid allegiance to the
monarch. At best it could be said to be only a symbol of independ-
ence. It did, as Nyerere has argued, provide a measure of legitimacy
for the new rulers, but it was not a strong, functioning instrument. The
document did not have the force of tradition necessary to implement
it, and was seen as a continuance of the western colonialism.93
The 1966 overthrow of the government produced a new and truly
independent constitution for the Republic of Uganda.94 However, the
second constitution did not satisfy Uganda's legal scholars, at least as
far as a course of national action was concerned. President Obote, who
took power in 1966, ultimately articulated the planned course of the
90. See Ghai, supra note 3, at 428-29.
91. Judicature Ordinance, 1962. See Morris & Read, supra note 3, at 238-44.
92. Id. at ch. 2; Byamugisha, supra note 79, at 80-81.
93. See generally GUKiNA, supra note 53.
94. The present Constitution of Uganda was officially adopted September 8, 1967.
Spring 19751
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
nation through the party platform, the Common Man's Charter. Much
of the legislation following the promulgation of the Common Man's
Charter brought an up-to-date look to Uganda. With the overthrow
of Obote, however, the Charter was laid to rest.95
95. The constitutional and political platform concepts of government as articulated
in the Common Man's Charter ended temporarily in Uganda in 1971 with the military
takeover of the nation by General Idi Amin. The takeover produced clear constitutional
and transnational violations so basic as to make many human rights concerns of the
United Nations pale in comparison. See Sharma & Wooldridge, Some Legal Questions
Arising from the Expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, 23 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 397 (1974).
When General Amin came to power he ordered all Asians (descendents of Punja-
his, Gujaratis and Goans who settled in Uganda as railway workers, aad made their way
into the professions and commerce) to report for classification on October 12, 1971;
as a result many Asians had their documents and passports taken from them. Sharma
& Wolldridge, supra, at 397-400.
On August 9, 1972, General Amin issued a decree revoking entry permits and resi-
dence permits for most non-citizen Asians. Within a period of ninety days most (ap-
proximately 55,000) of the Asian population in Uganda had departed leaving behind
abandoned property of every kind. Uganda, Economic War, 24 AFRiCA 33 (1973). The
property was abandoned due to two decrees issued in October, 1972: the first stated in
effect that Asians could not transfer immovable property. The second allowed agents
to be appointed to sell the property; however, the agents could not ia any way frustrate
governmental policy, i.e., Africanization of all properties involved in their dealings.
Sharma & Wolldridge, supra, at 401.
Abandoned property was taken over by Ugandans, mainly soldiers or their relatives
(Uganda, Economic War, supra), and no reimbursement has ever been paid for the lost
property. See Sharma & Wooldridge, supra, at 402-03. Although the government estab-
lished an Abandoned Property Custodian Board, their work was frustrated by the presi-
dent and the army. Uganda, Economic War, supra.
It would seem that the swift expulsion of some 55,000 people without permitting
them to take money or personal belongings is a matter that should be aired in the com-
munity of nations, particularly in the United Nations, or in the domestic courts of the
concerned nation, applying domestic constitutional principles. But although greatly con-
cerned with the plight of humanity in similar circumstances around the world, the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations failed to act on the expulsion of the Asians. Fur-
thermore, the Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities did not care to put the matter on its agenda. The United
Nations thus meekly agreed with the Uganda delegate, Mr. Ibingira, that the matter
should be confided to the domestic courts and laws of Uganda. See the well-documented
analysis in Sharma & Wolldridge, supra, at 404.
Chapter m1, art. 13 of the 1967 Constitution, still in operation although under sus-
pension, deals with expropriation of property. Article 13, cl. 1 does not permit a taking
of any property except for very limited purposes, none of which would fit the taking
from the expelled Asians. Clause 3, however, would permit a taking "in the public in-
terest" of any property. What is "in the public interest" would presumably be deter-
mined by the High Court under art. 13, cl. I(c)(ii), which grants a right of access to
the Court where the legality of a taking is in question. No case has been considered
by the High Court since "Phase I" of President Amin's economic war on the Asians
began in 1971. Within the present political climate it is doubtful whether any redress
can be offered by the domestic courts of the country. The fact, however, that the 1967
Constitution remains and that chapter 13 is intact, coupled with a long history of judicial
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Uganda and Judicial Review
An essential ingredient of constitutionalism is the use of the courts
to solve constitutional and political issues.96 Over the years this had
become an accepted function of the courts in Uganda, and the tradition
was carried over into the era of independence. Thus, the courts have
had a strong role in Uganda's government. There are several cases
that reflect the courage and commitment of the High Court of Uganda.
That court was, as long as the constitution was operating, willing to
interpret it even in politically sensitive areas.
The Independence Constitution authorized judicial review of con-
stitutional conflicts by the Uganda High Court.97  Furthermore, the
High Court was to determine the validity of the election of members
of the National Assembly.98 The concept of judicial review was never-
theless subject to executive suspension of the Constitution and to
declarations of a state of national emergency."9 However, short of
national emergencies, the High Court was empowered to decide
political disputes as well as any other disputes properly presented to
it.100 An analysis of selected High Court decisions will help in under-
standing the unique role the High Court played prior to the takeover
of the government by General Amin.
In Lyaboga v. Bakasonga'01 the High Court considered two issues:
First, it had to determine whether six members of the Busoga District
Council were lawfully elected as specially elected members and
whether a seventh member was lawfully Kyabazinga (constitutional
head) of Busoga.:1 2 Second, an injunction was sought to restrain the
six defendants from acting as members of the council and to restrain
the seventh defendant from exercising any powers and performing any
duties as Kyabazinga of Busoga.103
review, means that a change in political climate or leadership could also liberalize access
to the courts for the Asians who have lost all in Uganda's effort to return the businesses
and professions to Ugandans. The long and rich history of fairness in Uganda and the
use of courts to settle disputes cannot be suppressed indefinitely.
96. See Baldwin, A Constitutional Comparison, supra note 3, at 96-101.
97. THE CONST. OF UGANDA, ch. IX, s. 95 (1962).
98. Id. at ch. V, s. 49.
99. Id. at ch. II, s. 30.
100. See The Judicature Act, 1967. There are certain areas of dispute that courts
traditionally avoid. In the United States, for example, see Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964) (international relations). See also L. HENKiN, FORpGN AFFAmIS
AN TE CoNsrrrunoN (1972).
101. [1963] E. Afr. L.R. 57 (Uganda).
102. Id. at 59.
103. Id.
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The District Council of Busoga was empowered by the Second
Schedule to the Uganda (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1962, to make
provisions for its own membership by passing resolutions.' The
council had passed a resolution providing that it should consist of
eighty-four members comprised of sixty-seven directly elected mem-
bers, six specially elected members, and eleven hereditary Saza chiefs. L0 5
In this form the resolution was contrary to section 74 of the order,
which required that at least nine-tenths of the members should be
elected.' 06 Elections to the council were held for sixty-seven elected
members, and at a meeting of the council the six defendants were
chosen as the specially elected members of the council."" The sev-
enth defendant was elected Kyabazinga of Busoga. 08 The council had
not passed a resolution as required by section 75(1) of the Order, to
make provision for the mode of appointment of the Kyabazinga of
Busoga and his tenure of office.' 0 9
The Court held that the council had never been properly consti-
tuted in accordance with the requirements of section 74 and therefore
the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that the first six defendants
were not lawfully elected and that the council as constituted was
incompetent to elect the Kyabazinga." 0  Having granted the declara-
tions, the Court refused to grant the injunctions."' The Court stated
that it would have been idle to grant an injunction to restrain the first
six defendants from taking part in deliberations of a body which had
not been properly constituted and which was consequently incapable
of transacting business."12  The Court went on to say that it was not
disposed to grant an injunction to restrain the seventh defendant from
exercising any of the powers and duties of the Kyabazinga of Busoga."13
It is clear from the reasoning of the Court that the judges were
well aware of the fact that they were dealing with a political question.
Consequently, instead of giving an order that fresh elections should be
held in accordance with section 74 of the Second Schedule of the
Uganda Order-in-Council, the Court suggested that the executive out-
104. Id. at 60.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 62.
108. Id. at 63.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 61-64





line possible steps to take in order to solve the constitutional stale-
mate.114 In this way the Court undertook judicial review and decided
the issues, but neatly avoided a conflict with the executive. As a result
of the decision, the Busoga Validation Act 1 5 was passed. The act
validated the election of the council and hence that of the Kyabazinga.
Another example of the High Court's willingness to interpret com-
plex and basic constitutional issues involved certain of the Kabaka's
powers. In The Attorney General of Uganda v. The Kabaka's Govern-
ment," the Uganda government sought a declaration as to the con-
struction of the Uganda Constitution which incorporated an agreement
that had been made between the Uganda and Buganda delegations
prior to adoption of the Constitution." ' Upon independence the gov-
ernment of Buganda had retained -a great deal of autonomy. One of
the agreements entered into between Uganda and the Buganda govern-
ment dealt with the delegation of the financial responsibilities between
the government of Uganda and the Kabaka's government. 18
Schedule 9 to the Uganda (Independence) Order-in-Council 1962
provided that:
1. [In addition to her independent sources of revenue [Bu-
ganda's financial requirements] should be provided as follows:
(a) fifty per cent. by assignment of certain revenues raised in
Buganda (within minimum yield guaranteed)... and
(b) fifty per cent. by an annual statutory contribution from gen-
eral revenue (not to be reduced without consultation with the Ka-
baka's Government).
2. At intervals of from three to five years there will be a review
of these arrangements, not only to consider the rate of annual stat-
utory contribution, but also to consider-in the light of actual
yields-whether there should be any change in he revenues selected
for assignment.
4. Additional sums which may be required in respect of further
services for which the Kabaka's Government assumes financial re-
sponsibility will be made available by increasing he amount of the
statutory contribution. 1 9
The Court examined the language of the Constitution and con-
cluded that the words of paragraph one could be given at least three
114. See id.
115. Busoga (Validation) Act, 1963.
116. [1965] E. Afr. L.R. 393 (Uganda).
117. Id. at 395-96.
118. Id. at 394-96.
119. Id. at 395-96.
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widely differing interpretations.120  Furthermore, it held there were
certain ambiguities of expression in paragraphs two and four of the
schedule. 121  In consequence of the ambiguities and obscurities, the
Court was unable to ascertain the clear meaning of the schedule. 1 22 As
an aid to interpretation, the Uganda government offered as evidence
certain letters and records of meetings which were held principally in
London in June, 1962, at the time of the Constitutional Conference
which preceded the grant of independence to Uganda. 2 3 The Uganda
government argued that it was entitled to rely on these letters and
records as documents which demonstrated the history and intent of the
financial relationship provisions between the two governments. 24
The Buganda government countered that the Court could not con-
cern itself with the intent of the schedule, for its task instead was to
interpret the intentions of the legislature in making the Independence
Order, which had incorporated the schedule. Buganda opposed the
admission into evidence of the majority of the documents tendered. 25
The court decided to admit one letter, written prior to the Independ-
ence Constitutional Conference of June, 1962, and an appendix to a
report of the Constitutional Conference which preceded ,the Constitu-
tion. 1' The Court also admitted such other evidence as was necessary
to explain the manner in which block grants to local authorities were
calculated and the financial relationship existing between the two gov-
ernments at all material times.1 2r The remaining documents were re-
jected. The Court held irrelevant the opinions of the draftsman as to
the underlying intention of the legislation he had drafted and also held
irrelevant the opinions of those who instructed the draftsman.2 8
The Court cited section 107 of the Independence Constitution,
which read as follows:
107. (1) The Government of Uganda shall make payments to the
Kabaka's Government in accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement set out in Schedule 9 to this Constitution.
(2) The amounts required for making payments under this section
shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund.129
120. Id. at 396.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 396-97.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 397.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 399.
129. Id. at 400-01.
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The Court rejected the view that paragraph one of schedule 9 meant
that a calculation had been made of Buganda's financial requirements
at the date on which the Independence Order was made and that the
sum thus calculated was to be provided by the Uganda government in
the manner described in the two subparagraphs of the paragraph in
question. 30 The reasoning of the Court was that had such a calculation
been made, detailed financial provision for the period commencing on
July 1, 1963 (the date on which the antecedent of section 107 of the
Independence Constitution came into operation) would have been set
forth in express terms in a similar manner to that adopted for the transi-
tional period ending on June 30, 1963.'1'
The Court concluded that the intention underlying section 107 and
its dependent schedule was not to alter the method of calculating the
amount of aid to be supplied but to effect changes in the method by
which that amount of aid would be supplied to Buganda.'32 Further-
more, the judges were of the opinion that the amount to be paid or
provided to the defendant under paragraph one of the schedule was
not to be calculated for each financial year after section 107 came into
operation.133
Part of the financial assistance was to be provided by an annual
payment from the revenues of the Uganda government but that fact
did not mean that an annual calculation was to be made.' 4 Paragraph
four of the schedule made provision for an icrease in the statutory con-
tribution to be made by the Uganda government in -the event of the
assumption by the Kabaka's government of financial responsibility for
further services. 3 5 Thus if there was to be a review of the whole
scheme of assistance afforded to the Kabaka's government and if
further costs were to be met under the terms of paragraph four of the
schedule the legislature intended that Buganda's financial requirements
would be reviewed annually except to such extent as might be neces-
sary for the purpose of paragraph four of the schedule.13 6
The fact that the government of Uganda moved directly into the
High Court when a constitutional dispute arose demonstrated the
importance of judicial review to ,the new nation. The Court not only
130. Id. at 402.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 403.
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was called upon to interpret -the Constitution but also was asked to
referee a confusing and complex governmental problem. This delicate
political task was inherited from pre-independence judicial functions.
In 1961 the Colonial High Court had been called upon to
interpret the status of the Kingdom of Buganda within the colonial
state. The Kingdom of Buganda had won major concessions in the
Buganda Agreement of 1900.17 Buganda thereafter had the status of
a quasistate within the colonial protectorate. The question of jurisdic-
tion of -the High Court. over claims arising in the Kingdom of Buganda
was considered in Matovu v. Kabali.13 8
This case involved an ordinary agreement to sell land. The
plaintiff, Samiwiri Matovu, asked the High Court to require the
defendant, Kulanima Kabali, to return the land that Matovi had sold
him, alleging that the defendant had failed to make his installment pay-
ments and that the contract could therefore be declared void. 139 The
defendant objected on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that under the
Buganda Courts Ordinance title to the land was to be tried in a Princi-
pal Court, so the High Court had no authority to hear the case at this
stage. 140 If the case were transferred to a Principal Court, the facts
complained of brought customary law and statutory law into direct con-
flict. The High Court held that it was vested with the ultimate
authority to determine title to the land, and that the Principal Court
was empowered only to adjudicate whether a caveat that had been
placed upon the -title by the defendant should be removed. 141  Al-
,though a proceeding must be held in the Principal Court before the
High Court could grant relief, it was nevertheless the High Court which
would be the final arbiter of the conflict.14
2
Judicial Review and Pragmatic Considerations
As indicated in Uganda v. The Kabaka's Government and to some
extent in Matouvu v. Kabali, judicial review of the constitutionality of
governmental actions presented perplexing encounters between the var-
ious branches of the newly independent government. The encounters
brought to the surface complex factors affecting the entire posture of
the nation. In practice Uganda has been ruled by strong executives;
137. See Morris & Read, supra note 3, at 15-23.
138. [1962] E. Afr. L.R. 280 (Uganda).
139. Id. at 280-81.
140. Id.




however, as the Kabaka case points out, historically the concept of
judicial review has been respected, perhaps because of the intimate
relationship between the courts and the people of Uganda.
Throughout the long political regime in Uganda the courts, both
African and British, have had a great deal of contact with Ugandans.
The case of Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, Ex Parte Matovu 143
reflects the fact that the High Court of Uganda was, as long as a Consti-
tution was operating, willing to interpret it even in a politically complex
and sensitive area. The chief justice of the High Court, and author
of the opinion, was, interestingly enough, Sir Udo Udoma, a Nigerian
contract judge who wanted to Africanize the law of Uganda.
The case arose out of a resolution of the National Assembly in
1966 abolishing the 1962 Constitution and adopting a new Constitu-
tion. 144 Before the resolution the president and vice-president of the
country had been overthrown in violation of the 1962 Constitution.145
Their offices were removed and the authority of government transfer-
red to the prime minister with the consent of the cabinet.146 After
the 1966 Constitution was adopted by the National Assembly, a state
of public emergency was declared, and the Emergency Powers Regula-
tions of 1966 were enacted.14 7  These regulations were detention
laws, 148 and Mr. Michael Matovu was one of the government officials
detained under them. 4 ' He argued to the court that the detention
powers of the new government were outside constitutional powers; that
is, the detention powers were argued to be unconstitutional under the
1966 Constitution. He did not argue the validity of the 1966 Constitu-
tion, 50 but the Court raised the issue on its own motion.'15
The attorney general responded that the Court was not com-
petent to enquire into the validity of the Constitution because the mak-
ing of a constitution is a political act, and, alternatively, if the Court
should undertake to enquire into the validity of the Constitution, it was
bound to declare it valid because it was the product of a successful revo-
lution. 1 2 He argued -that the Court only had power to interpret that
143. [1966] E. Ar. L.R. 514 (Uganda).
144. Id. at 524.
145. See id. at 523.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 524.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 518.
151. Id. at 527.
152. Id.
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which was brought before it.1 3
Sir Udo Udoma's opinion is a curious mixture of praise and con-
demnation of the actions of Dr. Obote, then president of Uganda. The
opinion is also a curious counterpart to Marbury v. Madison.'" One
might even suggest that Sir Udo patterned his opinion after that of Mar-
shall. Certainly the conditions under which Ex Parte Matovu was
written presented interesting parallels with those in post-revolutionary
America.
Initially Sir Udo accepted the concept of the revolution as a fact.' 5
He -therefore declared the 1966 Constitution to be valid.'50 He would,
at this juncture, seem to have completely undermined the Court's
authority. However, it must be noted that the chief justice in making
'his ruling did not leave the interpretation of the Constitution to the poli-
tical branch or to the attorney general. Indeed, he went to great pains
to insure that the judiciary would make -the interpretation, even though
the interpretation itself would be one that was politically expedient.
The Court ultimately upheld the detention order under the 1966 Con-
stitution.
After having held in his favor, the Court proceeded to scold the
attorney general for arguing that this was a political question. The
Court pointed out that the attorney general was in error in relying on
certain American cases "as supporting the proposition that the issue as
to the validity of the Constitution of 1966 was purely a political matter
outside the scope of the jurisdiction of this court.' 57  Sir Udo distin-
guished the cases cited by the attorney general, especially Luther v.
Borden.5 8 He noted that Luther involved a contest between two com-
peting political powers over which should control the government of
Rhode Island. The Court stated that in Uganda there was no such con-
test because the government of Uganda had no rival, and thus Luther
v. Borden was inapplicable. 9
Sir Udo also distinguished Baker v. Carr,60 but in doing so he
used important language from Baker that supports a doctrine of judicial
review, stating that the decision in Ex Parte Matovu was, as Justice
153. Id.
154. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
155. [1966] E. Afr. L.R. at 538.
156. Id. at 539.
157. Id. at 533.
158. 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1 (1849).
159. Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, Ex Parte Matovu, [1966] E. Afr. LYR
514, 530-33, (Uganda).
160. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Clark said in Baker, "in the greatest tradition of this Court."'161 After
a lengthy analysis of the coup of 1966 and an analysis of the direction
of the then sole political party in Uganda, the chief justice held that
the Constitution of 1966 was the supreme law of the land. 162  It be-
came the new legal order, and its effective date was April 14, 1966.163
It would have been very easy for the High Court to have dodged
the issue as a political question. However, the Ugandan Court, in the
tradition of Marbury, refused to skirt the difficult issues; and although
the conclusion favored the government in power, the Court retained
the doctrine of judicial review for the nation. As the new chief execu-
tive said at the 'time of the decision:
[O]n this historic occasion three judges of the High Court on their
own motion as a constitutional court questioned the validity of the
1966 Constitution. Apart from their ability to do so, which in it-
self indicates the freedom of the judiciary to question actions of the
executive, there was never an attempt by the executive branch of
the government of Uganda to approach the constitutional court or
any member of the judiciary to conduct that important constitu-
tional case and to rule upon it in favor of the government. 64
Perhaps the president would not have been so generous had the deci-
sion gone against the government, but the fact remains that the question
was brought to the Court to decide, and the chief executive required
the attorney general to represent the government in arguments before
the High Court.
Conclusion
The Westminster parliamentary principles coupled with the ideals
set forth in the United States Constitution served as a blueprint for in-
dependence anglophonic constitutions in East Africa. For several
reasons, however, these concepts failed to generate positive responses
among the new nations' people and leadership.
First, though the United States Constitution was recognized as an
early successful attempt to regulate 'a modem nation by an original,
comprehensive, written charter, the anglophonic East African constitu-
161. [1966] E. Afr. L.R. at 534, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 262 (1962)
(Clark, J., concurring).
162. (1966] E. Afr. L.R. at 539.
163. Id. The preamble to the 1966 Constitution concludes with the following: "Do
hereby resolve on this 8th day of September, 1967, in the name of all the people of
Uganda, for ourselves, and our generations yet unborn, that the Government Proposals
be adopted, and do constitute and form the Constitution of Uganda which shall come
into force the day and year aforesaid." (emphasis added)
164. President A. Milton Obote, The People Newspaper, Jan. 23, 1969.
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tions tended to be little more than copies of elements from it and the
Westminster model, adopted without sufficient attention to the newly-
independent states' realistic needs.
Second, the circumstances of independence differed. England
had suffered no such birth trauma, and 'the American constitution was
written by the representatives and leaders of a culturally united people
who had by force of arms won their independence from a repressive
colonial power. In contrast, Uganda's boundaries were established
arbitrarily by colonial rule, and encompassed several culturally distinct,
and at times warring, nations and kingdoms, who had united momen-
tarily to accept independence from a relatively disinterested foreign
power.
Finally, the independence day Ugandan Constitution (and the
constitutions of other new nations) was foreign in origin, deriving its
initial validity from acts of the British Parliament.
Probably the most important reason for the failure of Westminster
parliamentary principles is the complex African concept of -nationhood
and nationbuilding, which is -the primary concern of most African gov-
ernments. It reflects not only nineteenth-century European and Amer-
ican concepts, but also the ideas of Marx. The African countries be-
came independent at various stages of national development, and were
burdened with the social and legal legacy of colonialism. The major
demands were thus for social and economic development.
The goals of national self-identity came first. Improvement of the
standard of living has taken a subordinate place to transformation away
from pluralistic economic, social and legal systems. Thus, with econo-
mies at a subsistence level, the people have not looked to constitutions
but to the ruling parties' political manifestoes as -the locus and philo-
sophical center of national power, for it is these party platforms that
address themselves to the real social and economic needs of the people.
But, as shown by the fate of the Common Man's Charter, manifestoes
have fared little better than constitutions as guardians of legality, even
though they address the nations' needs and problems more accurately,
because they depend so heavily on the men who implement them.
One bulwark that has stood in defense of principle, and which may
play that role in Uganda again in the future, 'has been the judiciary and
the tradition of judicial review. Rooted in Ugandan traditions, that
institution stands ready to play a guiding role and to nurture national
growth along the genuinely African paths envisioned by Obote,
Nyerere, and other African leaders. One can hope that in Uganda it
will again be given that opportunity.
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